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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines whether the prevailing model of capitalism with its hallmark
ﬁnancial markets is the most productive and stable investment system to underpin the
global economy into the future. It returns to the creation of the stock market in 1602 to
examine the stock market’s origin without the presumption of its respectability. Often
considered the genesis of modern corporations and contemporary ﬁnancial markets, its
venerable status is questioned. The instability of the system, established incidental to the
Dutch East India Company’s solution for ﬁnancing East Indies voyages and never intended
as a model for global capitalism, is found to be insurmountable. Rather than extrapolating
the current trajectory of capitalism, an alternative future based on the expansion of
productive primary economic activity, is considered. A movement that is evolving
spontaneously around innovative lending to expand business enterprises in the primary
economy offers the possibility of this alternative future with goals other than amassing
capital, more akin to the economic model that originally funded the Renaissance.
 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Just as it was being embraced globally, the 2008 Financial Crisis shook faith in contemporary western capitalism and
damaged the reputation of its hallmark ﬁnancial markets, triggering a quest for a more stable structure. Vehement criticism,
particularly of stock market volatility and derivatives, has come from a wide spectrum of economists. Their response has
overwhelmingly involved regulation, usually favouring elements of the suite of reforms that Bello describes as having ‘real
teeth’: the ‘banning of derivatives, a Glass–Steagall provision preventing commercial banks from doubling as investment
banks; the imposition of a ﬁnancial transactions tax or Tobin tax; and a strong lid on executive pay, bonuses, and stock
options’ (Bello, 2013). Less popularized, more targeted reforms of the stock market include Stiglitz’s proposal that there
should be only one other trading period after the initial public offering of shares (Stiglitz, 2013, p. 115) and Keen’s ‘jubilee
shares’ that expire after 50 years (Keen, 2012).
This paper does not propose the regulation or reform of the stock market nor consider the merits of any such proposals. It
takes an entirely different approach. Rather than asking the non sequitur: ‘How can we control ‘free’ markets better?’
capitalism is examined more broadly to establish whether the prevailing system is the best model to underpin the global
economy. It contests the view, implicit when only regulatory change is prescribed, that secondary markets are essential or* Tel.: +61 3 9809 0134.
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than re-adjusting regulations. It proposes that marginalising secondary markets is both justiﬁed and of greater beneﬁt to
capitalism than their protection or reform.
A premise of this paper is that ‘investment’ should directly relate to productive enterprise, not to unproductive ﬁnancial
transactions. The relationship between primary and secondary markets is its focus. The term ‘meta-economy’ is coined for
the aggregation of secondary markets in order to position them with respect to the primary economy. As Westerhoff notes,
this relationship has been studied less than the workings of the secondary markets themselves; the academic focus has been
on ‘the dynamics of ﬁnancial markets and (virtually) nothing is said about how the dynamics of ﬁnancial markets impacts on
the real economy and, likewise, how changes in the real economy affect ﬁnancial markets’ (Westerhoff, 2011, p. 21).
The most commonly accessed capital-raising secondary market is the stock market and, as a vital interface between the
ﬁnancial sector and primary economy, it is the focus of this paper. Singh (1993, p. 23, 2010) has recommended bank-based
investment rather than the development of stock markets in emerging economies but this paper’s proposal is slightly
different, recommending the demotion of the stock market, in favour of primary market investment as a different capitalist
paradigm. This future for capitalism may even have been instigated already; ‘peer-to-peer’ investing, an alternative means of
raising capital has developed spontaneously and rapidly while the number of companies listed on US stock exchanges
peaked in 1997 then fell by 38% until 2013 (World Federation of Exchanges data) and a similar decline occurred in Britain.
The proposed paradigm is not entirely new, however, as something similar operated during the Renaissance (Gelderblom,
2010; van Zanden & van Leeuwen, 2011).
It is difﬁcult to position this paper as it does not sit easily within the existing literature but spans across much of it,
idiosyncratically linking apparently conﬂicting ideologies over the 400-year history of the stock market. It accepts both
Marx’s view of the stock market as a ‘paper economy’ (Marx, 1894, Chap. 29; Stanford, 1999, 2008) and the aspirations of
neo-liberal ﬁnanciers who seek to operate within unrestricted ﬁnancial markets. Support for the unfettered operation of the
stock market, however, is not given with conventional justiﬁcations like ‘increased efﬁciency’, ‘transparency’ or purer ‘price
discovery’ and there is no engagement in the debate which pre-occupies the whole spectrum of ﬁnanciers and economists
from Greenspan (Andrews, 2008) and Bernanke (2014) to Shiller (2012), Krugman (2012) and Stiglitz (Moss & Cisternino,
2009) regarding the optimal nature and level of ﬁnancial regulation. This paper examines history to argue not only that the
very nature of secondary markets makes regulation ineffective in achieving stability, as has been demonstrated throughout
their existence, but also that they are not essential to capitalism. Unfettered secondary markets are given a place in
capitalism’s future simply because they are a means by which investors can retrieve their investment capital and the
coincidental speculative activities that are facilitated represent longstanding and entrenched economic freedoms; such
individual liberty being a deﬁning principle of capitalism along with private enterprise. This paper seeks to deﬁne a capitalist
structure that allows secondary markets to be circumscribed via a better understanding of their essential nature rather than
imposing a changeable stream of regulations. In broad terms, this paper can be considered as ‘pro-capitalist, anti-secondary-
market’, a vital distinction lost in most ‘anti-market’ rhetoric. It has no directive regarding state ownership or government
intervention and no generalised preference for globalism or localism.
The functioning of the stock market poses many ongoing theoretical challenges: Berle’s 1962 call (Ireland, 2001, p. 15) for
a new philosophical framework distinguishing share purchases from ‘investment’ remains unanswered; there is no
agreement on the causes of repeated market failure, only a plethora of disputed reasons, unique to each crash; philosophies
of market control are contradictory (Shiller, 2004, p. 14); opposing views are taken on the stock market’s role as an economic
indicator (Bosworth, 1975; Stock & Watson, 1989); research to relate share prices to their company’s underlying value has
produced inconclusive results (Fama & French, 1995; Djajadikerta & Nartea, 2005); advantages of ﬁnancing companies by
equity rather than debt are equivocal (Parrino & Weisbach, 1999, p. 4); in ‘balanced portfolio’ pension default settings,
shareholdings are acknowledged as ‘high risk’, the deﬁnition of ‘market stability’ is uncertain(Foot, 2003) and even the stock
market’s driving forces are disputed. Intelligent investors have been caught out by stock market caprice for centuries: Isaac
Newton lost 88% of his South Sea Bubble stake (Levenson, 2009, p. 244), Maynard Keynes dropped 82% of his peak portfolio
value in the 1929 Crash (Skidelsky, 1992, p. 342), Long-Term Capital Management lost $4.5 billion in 1998 (Lowenstein,
2008) applying directors Merton and Scholes’ Nobel Prize-winning derivative valuation formula and Warren Buffet lost
around $67 billion in the 2008 Crash (Beales, 2009) For nearly a century the stock market has been denigrated as a ‘casino’ by
eminent economists from Keynes (1936) to Stiglitz (2013, p. 91) and Kay (2008). Nevertheless, it remains a central pillar of
contemporary capitalism and its most venerated institution (Stiglitz, 2013, p. 98).
Since its inception, the stock market has been repeatedly subject to shocks. Focusing on historic crashes separately has
resulted in their ‘causes’ typically being identiﬁed amongst unique contextual factors. This paper reasons differently,
proposing that the market itself is the problem and external contextual factors merely set the scene and act as triggers. All
crashes are, therefore, symptoms of an unsound structure, the capricious stock market being easily de-stabilised by myriad
external factors. The unpredictability of psychology (and reverse psychology) on the sentiment of diverse traders that drives
the endless trading of intangible business arrangements in the stock market creates a pervasive potential instability which
can be triggered by many factors from political instability to de-regulation or irrational exuberance. Of all these variables,
none are readily governable to provide stability to the whole; so overhauling capitalism requires more than re-setting
ﬁnancial market regulation.
A pre-occupation with ﬁnancial market dynamics can reduce the future of capitalism to the identiﬁcation and viliﬁcation
of various aspects of ﬁnancial markets with critics railing against ‘Wall St’, exotic derivatives, the actions of speculators or the
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ethical behaviour. Examining deep history provides a new perspective. It allows an alternative path for capitalism, cut short
by the innovation of the stock market, to be identiﬁed and evaluated. Sinclair describes history as the main laboratory of
economists (Sinclair, 2013). The danger of not considering history or returning to the origins of the stock market is that its
existence may be accepted unquestioned, limiting change to tinkering with the status quo to perfect the internal logic of a
ﬂawed system. Contemporary analysis that starts and ends within an existing model possessing some internal logic can be
limited by ‘model blindness’ resulting in a failure to appreciate the possibility of an alternative paradigm.
The global uptake of the stock market, created incidental to the difﬁculties of raising long-term ﬁnance for East Indies
voyages by the Dutch ‘Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie’1 (VOC) in 1602 has been generally examined with a pre-
supposition of its intrinsic worth rather than evaluating its merit and impact on the wider economy. Critics of the stock market
‘casino’ have not clearly articulated how or why such an inappropriate institution should become so accepted and venerated
within the economy. This paper returns to the origins of the stock market to understand the reasons for developing a market
where speculation naturally proliferates and seeks to consider any gap between its intended function and the evolved reality,
with the purpose of assessing its suitability as a pillar of capitalism. The advent of the secondary market for shares was not
implemented as a new economic system after careful analysis but evolved piecemeal out of the need to conceal the dire state of
the VOC’s ﬁnances and ostensibly abrogated responsibility for shareholder capital. The new market was exploited immediately
for trading as a proﬁt-making end in itself, transforming the original investment into what is deﬁned in this paper as a ‘meta-
investment’ with a different ﬁnancial life. The company’s responsibility for meta-investments has remained a problem ever
since, confusing the ﬁduciary duty of directors (Mukunda, 2014) without increasing market stability.
This paper accepts the ‘casino’ label as more than a ﬂippant epithet, acknowledges the inevitability of speculation in
secondary markets and supports Gilson and Kraakman’s (2003) description of any mathematical evaluation of a complex socio-
economic system (Haldane, 2012) as ‘messy’ (Gilson & Kraakman, 2003). It concludes both that a ‘casino’ with its questionable
pricing models is unsuitable for a central role within capitalism and that regulation or exhortations for circumspect behaviour
by traders will ultimately fail. Taking a different approach, the unavoidable reality of the underlying nature of the ‘casino’ is
recognised by leaving it intact to provide economic freedom. Instead, combined with a re-examination of the appropriateness of
equity over loans, it is recommended that investment be channelled into primary markets. Recognising and accepting the stock
market as a casino and relegating, but not eliminating, secondary markets in favour of primary markets is this paper’s point of
difference from the overwhelming volume of literature devoted to reform in an attempt to make the stock market the venerable
institution for investment that many economists and ﬁnanciers would like it to be.
This paper proposes that the ﬁnancial sector, or meta-economy, and primary economy are potential alternative
foundations for capitalism and seeks to explain why primary markets offer a more stable and productive base. It questions
the conventional wisdom that the advent of the stock market was an unequivocal step forward and that earlier, less
sophisticated, bond-based systems with clear and simple responsibility for capital and in which stability depended on
seasons, plague and war directly (van Zanden & van Leeuwen, 2011), rather than through the lens of trader sentiment, were
inferior. The VOC’s secondary market system supplanted a prosperous and dynamic merchant capitalism that was
abandoned before it could be developed to the level of sophistication and accessibility of the contemporary secondary
market model. The success of pre-VOC capitalism demonstrates that secondary markets are not essential to capitalism. This
paper recommends the meta-economy be marginalised in favour of primary market activity to increase stability and return
some Renaissance vigour to capitalism, uniquely proposing, at the same time, that secondary markets should not be
abolished. The return to the simply regulated primary market transactions of mediaeval economics has been proposed light-
heartedly in the press (Hodgkinson, 2009) and the revolutionary potential of the new non-bank lending movement has been
noted by Haldane (Ali, Haldane, & Nahai-Williamson, 2012; Haldane, 2013) but this movement has not yet been thoroughly
analysed as the basis of an alternative future for capitalism.
Spontaneous change is currently occurring to link entrepreneurs requiring funds with investors providing equity or loans
of all sorts as peer-to-peer investment in a pre-VOC manner. This ﬁnancial model is under-recognised for its power to reform.
With recognition by governments and the involvement of institutions, it ironically represents the possibility of
revolutionising modern capitalism by returning to the alternative economic foundation of pre-ﬁnancial capitalism. The
potential of this movement risks being unrealised while it remains negatively classiﬁed as ‘shadow banking’ along with
derivative trading via channels designed to avoid regulation. Peer-to-peer investment is unconventional but not
uncontrolled and the risks and obligations in lending are well understood. Developing ‘broad and accessible’ primary
investment markets to efﬁciently direct funds to productive economic activity is proposed as a more generative and stable
future for capitalism than the current pre-occupation with building ‘deep and liquid’ secondary markets. If primary market
lending continues expanding rather than devolving into secondary market generators, capitalism could evolve along a new
trajectory. It is ironic that this spontaneous movement is termed ‘alternative ﬁnance’ as the development of innovative forms
of direct investment in the primary economy were a feature of the Renaissance economy before the VOC introduced their
alternative ﬁnance arrangements.
This paper seeks to contribute to the current debate, ﬁrstly, by proposing the return to a capitalism based on the primary
economy after highlighting the inadequacies of western capitalism’s current structural divide between the economy and1 United East India Company.
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described (de Vries & van der Woude, 1997, p. 274; Gelderblom, 2010; Goldthwaite, 2009) and defended (Cipolla, 1964) as
prosperous and dynamic.
2. Secondary markets: their prominence and instability
Financial markets produce no goods; instead, arrangements are traded. In the stock market, once a company raises capital
through an initial public sale, shares are endlessly re-traded without limits to ceiling price and produce no further revenue
for that company. In the 1960s, Berle insisted that this trading can never be considered ‘investment’ but required a different
philosophical basis (Ireland, 2001, p. 15). The new investment has been described as ‘ﬁctitious capital’ (Marx, 1894, Chap.
29), a bet (Martin, 2011), gamble (Keynes, 1936) and speculation (Keynes, 1936). In this paper, these ‘personal investments’
transmogriﬁed from the original company investment, are deﬁned as ‘meta-investments’. Chang notes: ‘as the degree of
‘derivation’ – or the distance from underlying assets – increases, it becomes harder to price assets accurately’ (Chang, 2011, p.
239). Meta-investments are the ﬁrst derivation and valuation difﬁculties begin there.
Value is established differently in primary and meta-economies. In the primary economy, Book Value, an accountant’s
measure of the value of a company carrying out its business, is essentially the sum remaining to be divided amongst
shareholders after a company is ‘wound up’, all assets sold and creditors paid off. Expressed as a price per share, it is easily
comparable with the company’s share price (Market Value) in the meta-economy. It excludes intangibles like future
prospects, patents, reputation, good will and management quality which all have value unless insolvency looms. When the
stock market is booming, the market price typically leaves Book Value behind so many ﬁnanciers consider it irrelevant.
Logically, Book Value is only irrelevant where a company’s failure is an impossibility.
In the meta-economy, the sentiment of purchasers supposedly factors intangibles in to Market Value but it can be
founded on anything, rational or otherwise. The scarcity and perceived desirability of the shares determine the price buyers
are prepared to pay for them. When Rio Tinto was trading at $120 in 2008, its Book Value was around $17. There is no
deﬁnitive explanation for the 700% difference. It could have represented ‘irrational exuberance’ creating high demand for the
limited supply of shares; intangibles like reputation; the price a rival company might pay in a take-over; predicted future
commodity prices, a guess at the value of resources still in the ground or simply reﬂect the magnitude of pension
contributions guaranteed to ﬂow into the market as monthly contributions that require a respectable home. Nobody can say
for sure.
Fama’s Efﬁcient Market Hypothesis (EMH) neatly describes the behaviour of meta-markets and how, for example, the
stock market efﬁciently translates all information about a company and the economic outlook into a market price. However,
in relating the accountant’s calculation of a company’s asset value to the market’s perception of its prospects as described by
the ratio of Book to Market Value, Fama found ‘no link’ in earnings and returns (Fama & French, 1995). Subsequent studies
outside the USA cannot conﬁrm a link (Djajadikerta & Nartea, 2005). Fama concludes we have ‘poor measures of the links
between stock returns and . . . fundamentals’ (Fama & French, 1995, p. 153). An alternative explanation is that there is no
quantiﬁable link as meta-markets move, unlimited by time or ceiling price, according to shareholder reaction to both
information and conjecture about the future in the context of personal investment goals, access to ﬁnance and risk appetite.
These are complex driving forces that can allow anything to happen despite the quantity and accessibility of information
now available. The EMH is unable to explain the gap between Book and Market Value nor why for every buyer believing the
available information indicates that a share purchase is a good idea, there is a seller that believes it isn’t. This mystery drives
the trading of intangibles.
Shiller, renowned for identifying price bubbles in housing and stock markets recognises that psychology (Shiller, 2003)
though often ‘discredited as unscientiﬁc’ (Shiller, 1984, p. 458), ‘may well be the dominant cause of movements in the price
of the aggregate stock market’ (Shiller, 1984, p. 459) and explains why returns are ‘nearly unforecastable’ (Shiller, 1984, pp.
458, 459). The possibility of graphing, in real time, any share price or the scaled average of a few representative stocks in a
market index suggests ‘forecastability’ by extrapolation but does not prevent surprises. Famous stock market crashes have
been examined minutely but the frequency of surprise downturns also warrants attention. A constant series of stock
market crashes followed the famous 1720s Mississippi Company and South Sea bubbles. There was the 1769 Bengal Bubble,
1792 US Panic, 1847 British ﬁnancial markets crash, 1882 Paris Bourse crash, 1893 US Panic, 1873 Panic and Vienna Stock
Exchange Crash, 1896 US Panic, the 1901 limited New York Stock Exchange crash, 1907 US Bankers Panic, 1910–1911
failure of large American investment ﬁrms, 1910 Shanghai Rubber Stock Market Crisis, 1929 Wall Street Crash, 1987 Black
Monday crash, 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 2000 dotcom bubble, 2008 Financial Crisis, 2010 Flash Crash and continued
volatility since.
With asset managers and institutions investing as agents on a large scale, holders of meta-investments also face localised
instability. Wikipedia contains a ‘List of trading losses’ of 45 asset write-downs of $US100 million or higher, overwhelmingly
related to derivatives (meta-meta-investments) and many associated with an individual trader. Not all are fraudulent but
simply part of the normal workings of secondary markets.
Blame for instability is typically attributed to a multitude of contextual factors. The 2008 Financial Crisis has been
variously ascribed to: greed (Greenspan, 2009); cheap credit; derivatives (Buffett, 2002; Chang, 2011); fraud; the failure to
understand risk (Stiglitz, 2010); unbridled risk-taking (Stiglitz, 2010); de-regulation; market ‘self-regulation’ (Stiglitz,
2010); the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act; ratings agencies; ending the gold standard; asymmetric information; a lack of
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& Rogoff, 2009); ﬂawed corporate incentives (Stiglitz, 2010); quantitative economics (Krugman, 2009); ‘ridiculous
calculations’ (Ormerod, 2010); social contagion or herd behaviour (Galbraith, 1977; Shiller, 2008, p. 41); predatory lending
practises (Stiglitz, 2010); inadequate competition (Stiglitz, 2010); cronyism (Stockman, 2013); short termism (Bair, 2011),
suppressed innovation (Stiglitz, 2010) and the belief that some activities are too big to fail (Stiglitz, 2010). Undoubtedly all of
these played a part in directing investor behaviour and that is the critical point; investor activity in response to all contextual
triggers is what drives the market and is ultimately responsible for booms and busts. The difference between triggers and
causes is subtle but vital and the focus on triggers is a distraction. Underlying all historic crashes is the temperamental nature
of investor behaviour as affected by contextual factors, trading goals, experience, ﬁnancial constraints, psychology and the
reverse-psychology of second-guessing future market movements. Debating the relative importance of triggers is irrelevant
if the capricious nature of the market itself is the problem; manipulating the administrable contextual factors will not
eliminate its ﬁckleness. The essential, underlying nature of secondary markets as sentiment-based vehicles ideal for
speculation has been overlooked in favour of detailed examinations of particular attributes and external triggers. Secondary
markets are pervaded by a potential instability of sentiment that is susceptible to many triggers. If, as sometimes assumed in
economic theory, traders had uniform, uncompetitive and modest goals, similar access to ﬁnance and information and there
was no price-distorting inﬂation of money supply or major information surprises, markets may be ‘stable’. Unfortunately,
markets are not ‘free’ if competition is eliminated and what deﬁnes a ‘stable market’ remains unclear (Foot, 2003).
Economists and even ﬁnancial market advocates have been strongly critical of ﬁnancial market behaviour. After the 1929
Crash, Keynes, a market devotee (Skidelsky, 1992), slammed it with metaphors, like ‘a game of Snap, of Old Maid, of Musical
Chairs’ (Keynes, 1936) where one must not snap too soon but attempt ‘‘to beat the gun’, . . . to outwit the crowd, and to pass
the bad, or depreciating, half-crown to the other fellow’ (Keynes, 1936). He likened it to a beauty contest in which economists
devote their intelligences to ‘anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be’ (Keynes, 1936) and was
concerned that the capital development of a country was becoming ‘a by-product of the activities of a casino’ (Keynes, 1936).
Such criticism is not new. Five years before the South Sea Bubble, Thomas Baston wrote a blistering tirade blaming the
‘vermin’ of stock brokers for destroying ‘all industry and honest gain . . . to put a counterfeit value where there is no real one
. . .’ (Baston, 1716). Cantillon (1755) who sold his shares at the top of the market in both the 1720 Mississippi Company and
1721 South Sea Bubbles warned against introducing paper currency to simplify the purchase of shares because a ‘bomb
would burst’ if there was ‘some panic or unforeseen crisis’ that caused a mass liquidation of shareholdings (Cantillon, 1755,
p. 323). Marx labelled stocks ‘ﬁctitious capital’ (Marx, 1894, Chap. 29) and Harvey describes stock markets trading ‘paper
assets’ (Harvey, 2006, p. 325) as ‘markets of ﬁctitious capital’ (Harvey, 2006, p. 276). The 2008 Financial Crisis revived the
vitriol. Krugman asserted economists had ‘romanticised’ the economy, ignored the limitations of human rationality and the
‘imperfections of markets – especially ﬁnancial markets – that can cause the economy’s operating system to undergo sudden,
unpredictable crashes . . .’ (Krugman, 2009) Thurow has found ‘major defects-recessions and meltdowns . . . permanently
embedded in capitalism’s genetic code’ (Thurow, 1999, p. 58) and Soros has repeatedly labelled ﬁnancial markets ‘inherently
unstable’ (Fletcher, 2010; Soros, 2011).
Such criticism gives any hope of control a poor prognosis. Because volatility continues despite the implementation of
various ‘solutions’ adopted throughout history, even the approach to control has become controversial. There is general
agreement that some exotic derivatives should be restricted, lending practices be made more rigorous and legal control
applied to fraud and insider trading (though computer-hacking potentially makes ‘insider trading’ endemic and incurable).
Then one school advocates watertight controls and early-warning systems while others advocate the de-regulation paradox,
using freedom for control (Shiller, 2004, p. 14), believing impediments cause instability in otherwise satisfactory markets.
Harrison’s analysis of 18th century derivative markets showed: ‘The clearest evidence that the regulations did not have their
intended effect is the repeated calls for new regulation’ (Harrison, 2003). This remains the case. At the end of the ﬁrst decade
of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the single worst period of stock market performance in US history (Davis, 2011) with half of its
public corporations disappearing through bubbles, scandals, and corporate failures (Davis, 2011), calls for new regulation
continue.
Despite its instability, the meta-economy is playing a growing role in the global economy. As long ago as 1984, Tobin
expressed uneasiness ‘that we are throwing more and more of our resources . . . into ﬁnancial activities remote from the
production of goods and services . . .’ (Tobin, 1984, p. 14) The contribution of ﬁnance in US GDP almost doubled between 1980
and 2006, just prior to the global ﬁnancial crisis, from 4.9% to 8.3% (Greenwood & Scharfstein, 2012).
The unstable component of the global economy has become a prominent economic indicator since the 1930s when Burns
and Mitchell included the stock market index with various data sets to establish a composite index to measure and predict
business cycles (Burns & Mitchell, 1946). Galbraith details a shift of focus away from the primary economy with the spread of
market fever in mid-1929 (Galbraith, 1977, pp. 99–100), despite the industrial situation indicating within months that the
economy was ‘well into a depression’ (Galbraith, 1977, p. 111). The forecasts of experts at the time are extraordinary: Nine
days before the 1929 Crash, Charles Mitchell, chairman of what became Citibank announced: ‘. . . the industrial condition of
the United States is absolutely sound . . . The markets generally are now in a healthy condition . . . values have a sound basis in
the general prosperity of our country’ (Galbraith, 1975, p. 94). The stock market may have been healthy but the primary
economy was not. Meta-markets were buoyed by their own success in a positive feedback loop, catching out experts who
‘read’ the market, including Yale economist Irving Fisher who declared just days before the 1929 Crash: ‘Stock prices have
reached what looks like a permanently high plateau. I do not feel that there will soon, if ever, be a 50 or 60 point break below
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94). If meta-markets are able to give the illusion of economic success for months after economic weaknesses begin to show,
they are an unreliable measure of the health of the underlying economy.
Galbraith describes the stock market as a mirror, providing ‘an image of the underlying or fundamental economic
situation’ (Galbraith, 1977, p. 111). His is, however, a one-way mirror: ‘Cause and effect run from the economy to the
stock market, never the reverse’ (Galbraith, 1977, p. 111). Galbraith’s point is that the stock market is a lagging, not
leading, indicator of the health of the economy. Though the economy has been found to be a leading indicator of stock
market performance (Chauvet & Potter, 2000), a reverse causal relationship is problematic (Bosworth, 1975). An
expanding economy can cause a stock market boom but, as Iceland’s 2008 economic and ﬁnancial collapse
demonstrated, a booming stock market does not indicate nor cause growth in the primary economy. In searching for a
predictive function, the stock market could be considered as a coincident indicator of sentiment towards equities, which
is insufﬁcient to make it a reliable leading indicator as regression analyses of 50 years of data re-conﬁrmed in 2013
(Hawksworth & Teh, 2013). Stock and Watson (1989) proposed a revision of Burns and Mitchell’s Index of Leading
Economic Indicators omitting stock market indices but it remains used as such (Greenspan insisting stock markets are
not only a leading indicator of economic activity but a major cause of it, Greenspan, 2013) typically on the basis that
expectations of future corporate earnings should translate into future GDP and predictive gaffs continue. Portes and
Baldursson reported less than a year before Iceland’s ﬁnancial collapse: ‘Overall, the internationalisation of the ﬁnancial
sector is a remarkable success story that the markets should better acknowledge’ (Portes and Baldursson, 2007) and, two
months before world stock markets crashed, heralding the 2008 Crisis, IMF Director Olivier Blanchard, wrote: ‘The state
of macro is good’ (Blanchard, 2008).
If the pattern of ‘ﬁnancial deepening’ (faster growth of ﬁnancial assets than the primary economy) is extrapolated, a
probable future scenario is as described for Britain by Bank of England Governor, Mark Carney: by 2050, UK banks’ assets
could exceed nine times GDP (Wolf, 2013). With clear parallels to Iceland, his caveat in promoting this was the need to
‘ensure [the ﬁnancial sector] is safe’ (Wolf, 2013). If, as discussed above, the meta-markets that comprise a large proportion
of the ﬁnancial sector (the stock, bond, derivatives and futures markets) operate in a constant state of potential instability of
sentiment and are uncontrollable, his caveat cannot be guaranteed.
This inspires many questions. How did an unstable component become so prominent in the economy? What was its
original purpose? Does it still function as originally intended? Was it always unstable or has something gone wrong and
needs rectifying? Answers will indicate the extent to which stability can be expected and assist in determining suitability of
meta-markets for a central role within capitalism and their dispensability.
3. How did unstable secondary markets become predominant?
Modern capitalist economies with their hallmark ﬁnancial markets were not established under constitution after
determining the best model for freely linking excess funds to productive enterprises. Laws were applied retrospectively
throughout the haphazard evolution of capitalism’s current iteration. The creation of the stock market was incidental to
the problem of raising long-term ﬁnance for East Indies voyages by the VOC. The Dutch Republic established the VOC
following the successful bond-ﬁnanced voyage to the East Indies by the new English ‘East India Company’ (EIC) in 1601
(Gardner, 1972), requiring 6 trading companies to amalgamate in 1602 and granting them both a monopoly and subsidy
for defence obligations. The 6 companies had experience of shorter voyages to Italy, West Africa and the Caribbean, each
trip funded separately by small groups of subscribers usually known to the organising merchant. East Indies trade
required a dramatic increase in investment for longer periods. Under their 21-year charter, 10-year bonds covering
multiple voyages were to be publicly issued and a dividend distributed when available cash reached 5% of company
capital (de Jong, Jonker, & Ro¨ell, 2013, p. 6). After 10 years and a publicised audit, investors could withdraw their capital
before a second 10-year bond was offered. Should investors need to re-coup their investment early, holders could transfer
ownership to a third party under a formally registered exchange process. This established a secondary bond market. The
new system attracted 1143 investors.
All did not go as planned. Demand for spices and sale prices were lower than anticipated (Gelderblom, de Jong, & Jonker,
2012, p. 2; Petram, 2011, p. 28) returning ships cost as much to repair as re-place (Gelderblom et al., 2012, p. 9) and the
government‘s defence obligations were inadequately subsidised (Dari-Mattiacci, Gelderblom, Jonker, & Perotti, 2013). High
equipping costs far in advance (Gelderblom & Jonker, 2004, p. 651) caused constant cash-ﬂow problems (Gelderblom et al.,
2012) and prevented capital accumulation (Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2013; Gaastra, n.d.). Finances were precarious for the ﬁrst
20 years (Gelderblom et al., 2012, p. 15). No dividends were paid for 8 years. Unsubstantiated reports of enormous VOC
dividends are questionable; using original sources and assuming full dividend re-investment, Petram (2011, Appendix B, pp.
204, 205) shows dividends paid amounted to only 3.7% p.a. in their ﬁrst century (Petram, 2014).
As the 10-year bond maturity approached, there was insufﬁcient capital to equip new ﬂeets and pay a dividend so the ﬁrst
dividends were offered in spices, which were not all collected (Gelderblom et al., 2012, p. 13). Because the company’s poor
cash position would be exposed by the audited bond payout, the VOC board successfully petitioned the government to have
its ten-year capital repayment requirement eliminated, arguing that the company would be weakened by premature
distribution of resources (Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2013, p. 2) and that investors would not be disadvantaged as the stock market
allowed them to retrieve their capital at any time (Gelderblom & Jonker, 2004, p. 656).
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investment capital could only be retrieved by selling to others. Investors protested but government support was high at a
time of peak maritime competition and defence requirements. Capital remained ﬁxed and Directors placated shareholders
with a 168% dividend (effectively the initial capital plus 6.8% p.a., approximating money market interest rates, Gelderblom &
Jonker, 2004, p. 668) whilst avoiding the public audit that would show the company’s weak cash position (Dari-Mattiacci
et al., 2013). After a second rollover without repayment and a renewal of the charter for another 21 years (Petram, 2011, p. 3)
the 10-year bond became a dividend-paying perpetual bond or, effectively, equity, creating the tradable ‘share’.
At the ﬁrst rollover, the VOC did effectively liquidate all bonds, paying the maximum ﬁnancial obligation faced under the
Charter. By declaring it a dividend, however, the VOC instigated an arrangement that required them to pay dividends in
perpetuity to all shareholders with no further capital injection, The VOC effectively paid out the original bonds but retained
their dividend burden and funded the running of the business separately on loans. Unfortunately, sales revenues continued
to lag behind equipment costs (Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2013, p. 15) so the company employed expedients like innovative
insurance on projected revenue and postponement of dividend payments to supplement funding from retained earnings (de
Jong et al., 2013, p. 7). Eventually, they came to rely entirely on separate borrowings from banks, state authorities and
wealthy individuals, by Directors who personally guaranteed the debt until 1623 when they managed to limit liability and
exclude recourse to their possessions. The company’s debt averaged 10–12 million guilders from 1622 until the end of the
century (de Korte, 2001, quoted in de Jong et al., 2013). The ongoing trading of VOC shares in the stock market brought no
beneﬁt to the company that originated them; whatever the company’s market price did, reacting to various states of war and
peace, dividend payments and rumours, the company’s position was one of indebtedness. The dividend decision that
effectively re-paid the bond whilst converting the capital to ﬁxed equity can be explained in the context of the time (fear of
disclosing the precarious cash position, shareholder pressure and so on) but the new arrangement failed to solve the debt
problem, erase the burden of ﬁnding new ﬁnance for subsequent voyages or mitigate any risks but added a dividend burden
to the precarious running of the business on re-circulating capital and loans until the ‘long, drawn-out death agony’ (Gaastra,
n.d.) of the VOC in 1800.
Meanwhile in England, the EIC repeatedly issued new bonds for the term of single voyages until 1657 and each of the six
ﬂeets sailing between 1610 and 1612 provided a proﬁt between 50 and 200% (Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2013, p. 18). A fair
comparison of the 2 companies cannot be made on solely on these returns as constraints and objectives were different
(Harris, 2009). The Dutch Republic’s brief expanded early beyond simply trading, adding the construction of colonial trade
infrastructure (Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2013, pp. 2, 6) and increasing the defence role (Dari-Mattiacci et al., 2013, pp. 2, 7, 8). The
EIC’s bond format, used successfully for over 50 years, has been criticised for preventing capital accumulation as bonds were
liquidated quickly after each voyage and a new company effectively established for the next expedition. However, English
bondholders adapted their use of the bonds to act as either short-term debt or long-term options as they could be used as
store coupons at face value (Marco & Vam Malle, 2007). The evolution of company bonds, adapting arrangements to suit new
goals, was cut short when the EIC adopted the VOC share model in 1657.
The reasons for the ascendancy of shares and stock markets over company investment using bonds are, however, not
clear. Bond markets receive ‘much less academic attention’ (Biais, Declerck, Dow, Portes, & von Thadden, 2006, p. 1) than
equity markets but Modigliani and Miller’s seminal paper on the ‘Cost of Capital’ (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) found no
clear advantage in equity ﬁnancing. Parrino and Weisbach note: ‘Despite over 40 years of research, we still know
surprisingly little about the determinants of capital structure’ (Parrino & Weisbach, 1999, p. 39). The prominence of
equity-ﬁnanced companies cannot be explained by limited liability, a feature of publicly listed companies introduced by
the VOC, without which every investor is ‘potentially liable to full the extent of their personal wealth, for a company’s
debts’ (Manne, 1967), as bonds also carry limited liability. As Jensen and Meckling asked: ‘If limited liability is all that is
required, why don’t we observe large corporations, individually owned, with a tiny fraction of the capital supplied by the
entrepreneur, and the rest simply borrowed . . . The fact is that no well-articulated answer to this question currently
exists in the literature of either ﬁnance or economics’ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, pp. 36–38). Parrino and Weisbach advise
that a ‘number of explanations, including bankruptcy costs, stockholder/bondholder conﬂicts and manager/stockholder
conﬂicts have been suggested to resolve this puzzle, but no consensus has been reached as to their relative importance’
(Parrino & Weisbach, 1999, p. 4).
Many consequences of the VOC model that changed the economic landscape were unplanned. The system never
functioned as intended, simply as a mode of early exit from very long term bonds. Speculation and trading started
immediately after the closing of subscriptions (de Jong et al., 2013, p. 6), sending the market price up by 14–15% (Gelderblom
& Jonker, 2004, p. 655). In its ﬁrst ﬁve years, a third of the capital subscribed in Amsterdam changed hands (Gelderblom &
Jonker, 2005, p. 8). Because payment for the bonds was set out in instalments over 4 years, there was a built-in speculative
opportunity for forward trading. Some subscribers bought more shares than they planned to hold (Gelderblom & Jonker,
2004, p. 654) and some experimented with futures trading (Gelderblom & Jonker, 2004, p. 655) from the start. By the time
‘trading clubs’ were established around 1660 (Petram, 2011, p. 45), there was a ‘fully ﬂedged’ market for futures and options
in Amsterdam (Gelderblom & Jonker, 2005). The market established to allow subscribers to recoup their capital by
transferring ownership to others was found to be a perfect trading platform but, as an investment platform, it failed to
alleviate the VOC’s ongoing problems with capital accumulation and cash ﬂow.
In its unintended role as a trading platform, the VOC’s stock market was never stable. The signs of trouble were evident
long before the South Sea Bubble with two earlier crashes. Peak optimism was reached in 1671 with record dividends and
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The third Anglo-Dutch War of 1672 changed sentiment, causing price volatility and defaults, so lenders reduced loans to70%
and the share price crashed by nearly half (Petram, 2011). In 1688 VOC shares lost over a quarter of their market value in
three months (Petram, 2011).
Nothing has changed in the fundamental structure of this secondary market. It has simply evolved into a faster trading
platform for increasingly large companies and trading houses described by Pinto as a market of ‘behemoths, permitting an
unlucky or dishonest trader to lose in seconds the equivalent of ten years proﬁts for institutions, which have often been saved
by the taxpayer’ (Pinto, 2014, p. 6). Taming this behemoth has been tried over 400 years. A complete break with the model
and Carney’s proposed future scenario of ‘ﬁnancial deepening’ (Wolf, 2013) is an alternative worth investigating.
4. Is there a more productive and stable alternative model?
After the VOC’s bonds were effectively paid out on maturity, the capital ﬁxed as equity and ‘the share’ introduced, the
company was run on loans in a de facto bond model with no new public subscribers, ironically the very model Directors were
afraid of when ﬁxing capital. It could be argued that this bond model would have been more successful if bondholders had
simply been paid off and the dividend burden eliminated early.
Logically, ventures best suited to public share subscriptions are those with high establishment costs and risk but vast
potential reward, like mineral exploration, cancer research or enterprises with creative potential but unproven proﬁtability,
like Amazon and Twitter (Streitfeld, 2013; Williams, 2013) Shareholders provide a large capital injection to cover
establishment costs and carry the risk, which they must believe worthwhile. For companies with a unique product that has a
safe, long-term market, a loan (or company bond) may be a better funding strategy than raising public equity, paying
dividends in perpetuity and inducing a permanent obligation to shareholders. Rolex, Ikea, Gore-Tex, Lego and Dyson, for
example, developed niche products and maintained company control and proﬁts by eschewing public listing. When the VOC
was established, previous bond-ﬁnanced East Indies voyages by the Dutch had demonstrated success with annual returns
averaging 27% (Gelderblom et al., 2010) and a manageable failure risk of around 20% (Bruijn, Gaastra, Schoffer, & Vermeulen,
1987, pp. 3–17), a proﬁle suited to bond ﬁnancing, public or private, the latter being effectively how it was run, utilising loans
organised by the Directors.
The Van Eeghen family demonstrates theviability of business models thatremained independent of the stock market. They were
among the few prominent 17th-century traders not involved with the VOC or stock market; being Mennonites, they were excluded.
In 1799 the VOC was bankrupt. The Van Eeghen Company survives, managed uninterrupted for 15 generations since 1662. Their
website timeline entry for 1929 reads: ‘Wall Street crash, Great Depression, protectionist wave hits free trading Holland. VE’s trade
survives well’ (Van Eeghen Group Company, 2013 Accessed 09.09.13). The current director  maintains separation from the meta-
economy, advising: ‘The ﬁnancial system needs to be in the service of the real economy’ (Biedermann, 2013).
Harvey notes that, historically, ‘capital had to be liberated from the constraints imposed by the family ﬁrm if it was to
expand and survive’ (Harvey, 2006, p. 276) but this need not entail public listing. Family capitalism, usually insigniﬁcant
after the Industrial Revolution, prevailed until the 1980s in Switzerland (Ginalski, 2010), which consistently ranks high in the
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report . The constraints of the family ﬁrm are debatable. Meindl,
handmade German shoemakers for eleven generations and similar to the pre-industrial model of a family company, has a
thriving global business. It is part of ‘Mittelstand’, Germany’s predominant business sector of family-owned or owner-
managed small to medium-sized companies ranging from artisan businesses to global ﬁrms. This productive economic
sector is growing faster than the Chinese economy (The Economist, 2011) with sales growth near 12% p.a., The stock market
is not Germany’s measure of economic strength; World bank data shows stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP
in 2013 was only around 43% compared with Britain’s 122%.
Islamic economics, founded on a balance of self- and social interests by applying a moral ﬁlter to economic decisions
(Chapra, 2001), forbids interest payments, dubious contracts and gambling (El Gari, 1993). The stock market is not ideally
suited to the paradigm; adaptation (El-Ashkar, 1995) is needed to keep the market ‘safe from gambling’ (El Gari, 1993, para.
4.5). Prohibitions against complicated ﬁnancial instruments helped Islamic banks avoid derivative debt losses experienced
elsewhere in the 2008 crisis (Wigglesworth, 2009).
Developing nations overwhelmingly remained outside the VOC model until the IMF and World Bank adopted the
‘Financial Market Theory of Development’ (Weber et al., 2009) in response to the 1970’s Third World economic crisis.
Evidence was found in favour of this approach for the years 1976–1993 (Levine & Zervos, 1996) but in 1997, Singh found to
the contrary (Singh, 1997) conﬁrming a previous view that ‘to the extent that developing countries do have a choice, they
should attempt rather to foster bank-based ﬁnancial systems than to establish and encourage stock markets’ (Singh, 1993, p.
23) and, in 2010, again arrived at ‘a negative overall assessment of the institution of the stock market in relation to economic
development’ (Singh, 2010).
Singh’s recommendation of bank-based development emphasises primary market activity over the meta-economy and
takes us back to pre-1602 Holland. It is a bold suggestion, implying that a more stable system can be established by
developing the primary economy not the meta-economy. Poland has done this: recognising Poland’s current ‘Golden Age’
Piatkowski ‘moves away from the usual stock market-like focus on the short-term’ (Piatkowski, 2013, p. 3) and reports on
productive entrepreneurs building a new economy based on providing manufactured products absent in the Communist
years (Cienski, 2013) and producing record GDP per capita.
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crowdfunding (Slade, 2013), social beneﬁt bonds (Liebman, 2011) and impact investing offering returns of all sorts, with or
without guarantees. Peer-to-peer investment is debt-based, equity-based, or hybrids including proﬁt sharing. The
arrangement is not new, however; Samuel Johnson ‘crowdfunded’ his 1765 edition of Shakespeare with subscriptions paid
prior to commencing its writing and George Harrison co-founded HandMade Films to fund ‘Life of Brian’ in one of the various
peer-to-peer arrangements used to ﬁnance several Monty Python ﬁlms.
Bonds have been described as instruments created for and sold to ‘pessimists’ and shares to ‘optimists’ (Alchian & Demsetz,
1972, p. 709). Being unlimited by time, endlessly re-tradable shares are less restricted than time-limited bonds but they are a
puzzling ﬁnancial instrument. Ireland writes: ‘Company lawyers are clear what a share is not . . . it is not an interest in the
corporate assets. But they are much less clear what it actually is’ (Ireland, 1999, p. 2). Ireland explains the relationship between
shareholder and company is: ‘not exactly one of lender to borrower – the share is not, as some have suggested, a kind of loan –
neither is it in any meaningful sense one of owner to owned. The share is a particular and distinctive form of money capital;
property in the form of a claim on the company’s proﬁts’ (Ireland, 1999, p. 16). They are a passive property entitlement carrying
no guarantee of receiving dividends. Bonds are simpler, being essentially a loan, providing capital directly to companies. They
consist of many, variable components including maturity dates from short-term to perpetual, ﬁxed or ﬂoating coupon (interest)
rates, the possibility of dividends, levels of guarantee, embedded options like extendibility and different issuing arrangements
(set price or auction). They can, therefore, be customised for a broad spectrum of general or project-speciﬁc applications, from
single producers being crowd-funded or micro-ﬁnanced like the Jobra villagers who received loans from the Grameen Bank
(Yunus, 1998) to wireless giant Verizon which executed a record bond sale (Cherney & Wirz, 2013) by global auction in 2013.
Bonds’ merits and versatility are not reﬂected in their low proﬁle. Although access to stocks of all risk proﬁles has been
democratised, bonds have not been freely available. In many western economies including the US, UK and Australia, non-listed
bonds traditionally have only been accessible, under various Acts, to qualiﬁed and accredited institutional or ‘professional’
investors making large minimum investments. Private investors must pass individual wealth or ‘sophisticated investor’ tests
even for low-risk bonds akin to term deposits. It is not surprising that alternative channels are meeting demand for this
inaccessible, under-developed and, therefore under-utilised (Davis, 2010a) formal investment. If all loans are considered to be
bonds, the instrument is in great demand but has been fragmented and hidden. Exploiting the ﬂexibility of every bond
component, creating new varieties, publicising them and matching the broadest possible range of investors to enterprises
requiring capital, the essence of a primary market model, offers scope for change.
In 2012, the Bank of England’s Executive Director of Financial Stability, Andrew Haldane, noted that lending is the ‘new
frontier’ (Ali et al., 2012) and in 2013 declared changes to primary market investment a ‘mini-revolution’ carrying profound
implications (Haldane, 2013), distinct from the increased ﬁnancialisation proposed by the Bank’s Governor (Wolf, 2013).
Haldane noted: ‘With open access to borrower information, held centrally and virtually, there is no reason why end-savers
and end-investors cannot connect directly. The banking middle men may in time become the surplus links in the chain’ (Ali
et al., 2012). Peer-lending company, ‘Lending Club’ was named number 5 on Forbes Magazine’s most promising companies in
2014. (Forbes Magazine, 2014) Time will tell if banks, traditionally ‘resistant to the high-risk loans which many small
businesses represent’ (Wilson & Larson, 1994) but not averse to the risks of the meta-economy once the Glass–Steagall Act
was repealed, have misjudged risk and the best future for capitalism.
Developing ‘broad and accessible’ global primary markets devoted to investment, not trading, that are accessible to
issuing companies on every scale from micro to mega and matching them to ‘household investors’ not just the currently
over-represented institutions (Black, Kirkwood, Rai, & Williams, 2012, pp. 5, 21) would be a radical departure from ‘deep and
liquid’ secondary markets that is capable of changing the nature of capitalism.
Mimicking the VOC subscribers, who developed the stock market as a trading platform, the emerging primary market
movement is being led informally by opportunistic entrepreneurs, not by business professionals or governments. Tech-savvy
entrepreneurs are developing investment platforms and exploiting advancements like mobile banking and the widespread
use of phones, even in the Third World, to increase ﬂexibility in microﬁnance (Kumar, McKay & Rotman, 2010).
Ironically, the ﬂexibility and creativity of this ‘alternative’ investment movement was a characteristic of economics in
Europe before the VOC opened their alternative ﬁnance model. Prior to the advent of the VOC share, entrepreneurs developed
a range of joint venture company contracts formalised in notarial deeds, various credit operations like selling annuities
secured by real estate to raise lump sums and transferable, interest-bearing loans with a standardised maturity of 3, 6 or 12
months called promissory notes, bills obligatory or IOU’s (Gelderblom, 2010, pp. 156–182) There is no reason to expect that
modern opportunists cannot lead capitalism’s evolution again. By abandoning the unstable meta-economy and pursuing
direct investment opportunities as instigators or backers, they may move the economy in a new direction. Governments
could play various roles, establishing facilities that link investors to entrepreneurs needing funds (should this ﬁt with their
national politics) or investing themselves and potentially beneﬁting ﬁnancially while being seen to support small business.
British taxpayers stand to gain up to 12% interest on the £40m government investment promised in support of small business
in February 2014 using Funding Circle, one of the UK’s largest peer-to-peer platforms (Moore, 2014). Governments’ greatest
potential impact would be by channelling pension funds into direct investment in primary economy activity rather than the
meta-economy, stimulating increased business activity.
The primary market for bonds cannot be expected to be problem-free and requires careful oversight to avoid the
problems of interest rate volatility, imprudent credit guarantees, investor exposure to non-guaranteed bonds and unreliable
credit ratings that were faced by the Korean corporate bond market after the 1997 currency crisis (Kim & Park, 2002). Laws,
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human and environmental objectives. Peer lending is now sufﬁciently established as ‘alternative ﬁnance’ to have attracted
the attention of regulatory authorities. The British Financial Conduct Authority published their proposed approach to the
regulation of peer-to-peer investment aimed at ensuring risks are transparent and comparisons clear before assuming
responsibility for the sector in April 2014. Regulation is likely to have more impact on creditworthiness and business
practices in a primary market model than on sentiment in a meta-economy.
Undoubtedly, these primary market investments will be re-traded. If the resulting re-pricing and risks are understood
and accepted by both parties, trading need not be restricted. The breakthrough that will turn current primary market
investment innovations into a revolutionary force capable of re-directing capitalism, however, will be the development of
platforms aimed at primary market investment that continually expand their portfolio of companies, break down the
conventional obstacles to small businesses and improve ratings and research, rather than seeking to develop a secondary
market for re-trading these contracts.
Large players and large sums ﬂowing in from pension funds increasingly dominate the meta-economy. A primary market
model would fracture investment into myriad smaller destinations. This accurately reﬂects the primary economy that is
constituted of a multitude of small activities, few of which are amalgamated into large corporations: small businesses make
up 99.7% of U.S. employer ﬁrms and 98% of ﬁrms exporting goods (Kobe, 2012). In Germany, more than 99% of companies are
small or medium and provide more than 60% of all jobs (Welcome to Germany website, 2014). If a primary market model
alleviates the most challenging problem for small enterprises, the cost and difﬁculty of raising funds, there could be a
ﬂoodgate opening sufﬁcient to change the nature of capitalism.
Gen Y presents the possibility of two different economic futures. Australian statistics show nearly half the ﬁnance
sector is under 35 (Australian Bureau of Statistics website, 2014, Accessed 20.01.14) but the cohort is divided. In a 2012
US Investment Sentiment survey, 40% of investors in their 20’s agreed: ‘‘I will never feel comfortable investing in the
stock market’’ (Light et al., 2011; MFS, 2012). So while some strive to continue the trajectory of ﬁnancial capitalism,
another group may contain the seeds to grow a primary market investment movement. Market advocates believing Gen
Y’s uneasiness with the stock market is unfounded make attempts to convince them of its merits may fail, as their
reasoning typically compares average stock market returns with current near-zero interest rates (Baillieul, 2013), not
with the direct investment opportunities they are embracing (Stengal, 2014). If business purposes embrace wider goals
than amassing capital, like developing cancer cures, a bionic eye, jetpacks, 3D printed vehicles, expanding libraries
globally or popularising heritage plants, the term ‘Capitalism’ may become inadequate to describe the new market
system.
’Undoing’ the focus on meta-markets would be a challenge for primary market capitalism. Along with private-sector
commitment to meta-markets, Western governments direct compulsory pension funds into the meta-economy and public
funds are invested in secondary and tertiary markets, sometimes with disastrous losses (Shanahan, 2012). Options for
reversing this commitment are limited. Abolition or rigid restriction of ‘free’ markets is unrealistic. Individual economic
freedom has, however, been removed by agency. Ending vicarious ‘investment’ of public funds in the meta-economy and
requiring express majority consent is one way of changing the economic landscape but would cause ﬁnancial mayhem.
Facilitating the growth of primary investment in a wide range of businesses would be a better way of moving funds out of the
meta-economy and no existing freedoms need be rescinded. In the spirit of respecting freedom and choice, the meta-
economy could be further de-regulated to operate more freely, recognised as the speculators’ domain in a free, composite
economy.
If the meta-economy does not predominate, capitalism would behave more like Renaissance economies prior to the
establishment of the VOC’s stock exchange. This is not necessarily regressive. A long period of growth featuring technological
advancement and the astonishing entrepreneurial success of Dutch traders, farmers, manufacturers and craftsmen
(Gelderblom, 2010) began in the 1540s, six decades before the stock market was established (van Zanden & van Leeuwen,
2011) and ended around the time of the ﬁrst stock market crash in 1672 (van Leeuwen & van Zanden, 2011a, p. 1) with
decline or stagnation until the VOC’s bankruptcy in 1800 (van Leeuwen & van Zanden, 2011a, p. 1). The pinnacle of early-
modern capitalism, therefore, could be attributed to merchant capitalism prior to the establishment of the stock market, not
in its innovation. Gelderblom reluctantly ascribes the loss of economic lustre to prominent capitalists favouring ﬁnance over
creative enterprise (Gelderblom, 2010). Goldthwaite’s studies of Florence’s Renaissance economy (Goldthwaite, 1993, 2009)
found that investment in human endeavour, innovation and artisan activity with goals other than market domination spread
wealth broadly, ultimately supporting the wider economy. It was a productive model; ‘dynamic capitalism’ (Phelps, 2006)
was achieved in the Renaissance without a predominant meta-economy.
5. Conclusion
The stock market, planned as a service to investors who required early liquidation of the VOC’s unprecedented long-term
bonds, never operated solely for this purpose. The bonds were re-traded almost immediately and futures, options and
forward contracts were developed. VOC bonds were forcibly transformed into the legally perplexing (Ireland, 1999) ﬁnancial
instrument of ‘shares’ that were re-traded as meta-investments producing no goods and making no direct contribution to the
company. The VOC structure that was immediately understood to be an ideal trading platform evolved to become an
unproductive meta-economy that comprises a major part of a global ﬁnancial sector. Trading meta-investments without
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investment is based. By logical extension, the meta-economy cannot be expected to reﬂect the state of the primary economy.
Despite this, the stock market continues to be used as a leading economic indicator regardless of the numerous spectacular
predictive failures that have occurred when the meta-economy has been used as a forward indicator of economic prosperity
(Blanchard, 2008; Galbraith, 1975, p. 94; Portes and Baldursson, 2007).
The stock market has never been ‘stable’. Shocks and crashes began in the 17th century and continue, as all attempts at
control are unable to overcome the fact that trader sentiment cannot be predicted or controlled. Nevertheless, the meta-
economy has grown more rapidly than the primary economy (Greenwood & Scharfstein, 2012) and, being supported by a
guaranteed supply of pension money forcing share prices above their book value, places capitalism on a trajectory of
increasing ﬁnancialisation and instability.
There is an alternative scenario based on developing the primary economy through direct investment in the myriad small
businesses that comprise it (Kobe, 2012; Welcome to Germany website 2014, Accessed 20.11.14), using creative forms of
investment and lending. If all loans are considered as bonds, this instrument is not so much underused (Davis, 2010b) as
dispersed and concealed. Company bonds, a loan that can take many forms with many variables, have been overlooked in
favour of shares (Davis, 2010a, 2010b). A grass roots movement is changing this. In response to unmet demand, the business
opportunity offered by matching enterprises with investors and assisting small enterprise overcome their biggest hurdle,
raising capital, has been seized and innovative peer-to-peer bonds, which exploit technology to maximise their reach, have
been developed (Forbes Magazine, 2014). These fracture investment into small components but this accurately reﬂects the
needs and composition of the primary economy. So long as primary market investment continues to be broadened and
transparency improved to better embrace more primary economic activity, rather than being developed in order to generate
a secondary market, this movement represents a potential renaissance for capitalism.
In 2013, the Bank of England’s Executive Director of Financial Stability declared new forms of lending an ‘embryonic
ﬁnancial revolution’ (Haldane, 2013) while the Bank’s Governor proposed an expanded future role for the ﬁnancial sector
(Wolf, 2013). If capitalism is at the crossroads, the primary economy is the road less travelled. Should further research prove
that direct investment in the primary economy provides greater economic growth and stability than investment in the meta-
economy, the development of this road can be hastened by institutional support for investment over trading, particularly
through government pension policies.
If the meta-economy was simultaneously freed to operate as an unrestrained secondary market but no longer central to
investment, the economic model supporting a multitude of business objectives other than amassing capital would no longer
be mere ‘capitalism’, making the ‘renaissance’ also the end of ‘capitalism’. Whatever it is called, an economic model allowing
the renaissance of the primary economy would be more akin to the model that funded the Renaissance, the extraordinary
period of history which occurred before the VOC’s stock market was introduced and changed the course of economic history.
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